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Abstract 
Consiaeration is mm of me most important ele 
to constitute a valiu and enforceable contract. Hell 
it has caused confusion “If-”Ha the law students and lawyers 
alike. :cvisicn of uil‘fer'ent iaws nas worsen the 
situations arm tnis is iy so in ﬁnal: 
'l‘ne contract law of is governed by 
the .ﬁaia' in Ccntracts Act 1:06“ 1:; :: statutcry law 
. ﬁ . . 2 drafted s “1131‘ :0 turn. 01 ml: lmuan Contract act . As 
far as tn».- Inui-‘1 Contract Act is concernfad, one famous
7 author, sir E‘recerick Pailock), has said that the 
characteristic of that not was tnat it was a code of the 
in La... L‘nat author be true, but it should he Sngl 
noted that not all provisions under the dnglish Contract 
law are couifiec into that Act and even some of me 
codifieu provisions are in aisagreement to the .inglish 
contract law. AF. abvious depgrture from tne .mﬁlisn law 
can be seen in cases on yast consideration. 
Therefore, the primary objective of this 5 any is 
to analyse the nifferences between the Mal . ian Contracts 
Act 1750 and the Lngiisn Law insofar as consideration is 
concerned. The sway, However, is not confined to tnese 
two laws only infact it extends to the Indian position. 
1. Contracts Act 1950, Act 156, Revised 1974. 
2. Indian Contract Act, Act IX of 1572. 
5. BULLOCK, Sir Frederick; i'LLLOCh or. NULL; on Indian 
Contract anu Specific ieleif Act; p. xi.
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‘he presence or absence of consiueration Has been 
the crucial factor in developed English law ever since the 
sixteenth century. It is n tuml to assure that the 
aucytion of such a test cunnected tr: Mme underl'dng 
tﬁénry as to why agreemenﬁ? are enforced. 'Cwsideratian' 
has been forcefully argued '1," a word long rooted in the 
ates it: fundamental 'nu .yage of.‘ rJnglish 
attitude to contract ".31” m a when ‘3: Lawyers in the 
mindle 0A the sixteenm co. bury, evoived thro ' the 
9:31 contractua’i‘remedy, they action of assumpsit, a 59 
decided that it would not wail to redress tne branch 
tever its nature. It Has of any and every promise, w. 
beer: said, in particular. that it was decided that 
assumpsit was not to be used to enforce a gratuitous 
promise so that plaintiff must show that the uefenaant‘s 
promise upan which he wws suing, was part of a bargain 
to which he himself has contributed to. ’l‘nerefore it 
has been persuasively argued that the doctrine of 
consideration represents the adoption by :lnélish law 
of the nation that only bargains should be enforced. 
Consideration at this point has been said to mean a 
reason for the promise being binding, fulfilling 
something like the role of cause. or cause in continental 
system.1 
Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
century, the doctrine of consideration had been accepted 
as an integral part of the new law of contract. However. 
its pride of place was challenged when Lord Mansfield 
was made the Chief Justice of the King's Bench where 
in the case of rinlmim v Em» “1.34052 he treated 
consideration as merely an evidence of the parties 
‘1. FIFOU'I‘, History am sources of the Common Law 
amsou, 54 L».,'1‘ 235 
Slui‘JUN A.B.‘«'; A History of the Common Law of 
Contract: The Rise 01" ussnmpsit (1975) 
2. (1756) 5 Burr. 16w
intention to be bound and refused to recognise it as the 
vital critericcm of a contract. "his attack of Lard Mansfield 
was, however, repelled in mum v HUdoi where it was proclaimed 
that,
l 
" all contracts 9519' by tne laws of England 
distiriguished into agreements by specialty 
and agrer-ments parol; nor is there any. such third clws ..... as contracts in 
writing. If t“ / be merely written and 
not specialties, tne‘x‘ are pargl, and a 
consideration must be proved." 
Lord Iuansfield‘s second attack on consideration was 
much more unpleasant. 'w'hile endorsing consideration as 
essential to a contact he defined it in terms of moral 
obligation as he din in MA; v .mUu ‘4. However it 
wzxs repudiated a hundred years later in the case of 
AnufJLLLA v 149:5 when Lord Demm' condemned the'whole 
principle of moral obligation being an innovation of 
hard Mansfield, and that to destroy it would be .to 
restore the pure and original doctrine of the common 
law. He further pointed out that the logical inference 
from the acceptance of moral duty as th'a sole test of 
an actionable promise would be the destruction of 
consideration. The law insisted some additional factor 
to the defendant's promise. whereby the promise became 
legally binding; but if no more was needed than the 
pressure of conscience, this would pperate as soon as 
the defendant voluhtorily assumed an undertaking. 
j. (15723) 7 Term Rep jSO 
4. (1782) 1 CW? 289 
5. (1840) an a 51 4'58
